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Using a balanced panel of 264 unique Illinois farmers from 2000 to 2004, this study 
identifies the most pertinent factors that explain the repayment capacity of farmers. After 
correcting for endogeneity bias caused by farmer-specific effects, one year lagged debt-
to-asset ratio and soil productivity are both found to be significantly correlated with the 
coverage ratio at the 5% significance level using random effects. The finding is 
significant because it can enhance agricultural lenders’ ability to assess creditworthiness, 
screen borrowers, manage loan loss reserves, and price loans, thereby decreasing lenders’ 
costs associated with defaulted loans and ultimately reducing the costs borne by the 
government and taxpayers. 
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2 1. Introduction  
The need to analyze loan quality remains an important issue given the large 
numbers of farmer loan defaults and bank failures (Turvey, 1991). Zech and Pederson 
(2003) argue that the lack of consensus concerning a unique set of variables to explain 
creditworthiness creates an environment where lenders develop different models “in 
search of specifications that best predict farm performance and repayment capacity of 
farmers”.  
The main objective of this study is therefore to statistically explore factors that 
explain the repayment capacity of farmers (a measure of creditworthiness) using 
individual loan quality information.
1 Possible endogeneity bias caused by farmer-specific 
effects is accounted for by using panel data instead of cross-sectional data. The data used 
is obtained from the Illinois Farm Business Farm Management (FBFM) Association 
between 2000 and 2004. Results from the analysis will help lenders to isolate the most 
pertinent factors to consider when building credit scoring models in order to ensure 
accurate estimations of creditworthiness. 
Credit scoring models aid in evaluating creditworthiness by monitoring loan 
quality within the Farm Credit System and other lending institutions. Because financial 
theory offers little specific guidance as to which explanatory financial variables should be 
used to assess creditworthiness, a variety of explanatory variables and estimation 
techniques have been explored for credit scoring models (Oltmans, 1994). For example, 
Lufburrow et al. (1984) use liquidity, leverage, collateral, and repayment history; Miller 
and LaDue (1989) use profitability, liquidity, solvency, efficiency, and farm size; Fischer 
                                                 
1 Individual loan quality information is collected from farm-level business data. 
3 and Moore (1986) use profitability, leverage, and efficiency; and Mortensen et al. (1988) 
use only leverage and efficiency to explain creditworthiness.   
The agricultural finance credit scoring literature includes linear probability 
models, discriminant analysis models, logit models, probit models and regression models 
that use discrete dependent variables (Turvey, 1991; Splett et al., 1994; and Turvey and 
Brown, 1990). Recent studies using linear regression models have utilized continuous 
dependent variables (Novak and LaDue, 1997; and Oltmans, 1994).  
One issue with credit scoring models is that there is no consensus on which 
structural model to use and which explanatory variables to include to explain variations 
in credit risk factors (Gustafson, 1989). With a well defined set of explanatory variables, 
more accurate credit scoring can be achieved. Greater accuracy in credit scoring is more 
important to agricultural compared to non-agricultural lending institutions; the former 
cannot diversify their loan portfolio as well as the latter because the riskiness of the loan 
portfolio is higher in the agricultural sector (Turvey and Brown, 1990).  
A more accurate credit assessment model used to evaluate loan applications and 
creditworthiness of borrowers results in more accurate loan pricing decisions; therefore, 
reducing the interest charged on loans issued to farmers (Lufburrow et al., 1984). 
Furthermore, improved credit scoring models enhances lenders’ ability to screen potential 
borrowers and manage loan loss reserves, thereby decreasing the costs associated with 
defaulted loans. Poor credit assessment methods may increase lending errors. For 
example, lenders may provide loans to very high risk borrowers (Type I error) or not 
provide loans to low risk borrowers (Type II error). In both cases, the lender loses profit. 
For Type I errors, the lost profit includes lost principal, lost interest on the principal, and 
4 additional costs incurred for administration, legal fees and insurance coverage. For Type 
II errors, the lost profit is the difference in expected profit between a good borrower who 
is denied the loan and an alternative borrower who is issued the loan but may be a high or 
low credit risk borrower (Nayak and Turvey, 1997). A high number of Type I and Type II 
errors might negatively affect the amount of credit available to the private sector by 
depleting banks’ capital, increasing banks’ deposit liabilities, reducing savings rates, and 
increasing loan losses. All these factors may result in an economic contraction (Fofack, 
2005). 
  To reiterate, no consensus has been reached on a specific set of variables to 
explain creditworthiness and, even worse, the effect of endogeneity caused by farm-
specific effects is often overlooked. Furthermore, few existing studies on 
creditworthiness have used a continuous dependent variable. 
  This study addresses some of the important gaps in the literature. Most notably, 
this research uses a continuous dependent variable instead of a discrete dependent 
variable for creditworthiness for Illinois farms. This approach prevents loss of 
information. Furthermore, this research employs panel data techniques that allow time 
invariant farmer-specific effects to be explored and corrected for. This is important 
because farmers might be inherently different from each other. For instance, one farmer 
might have low risk aversion, another farmer might have high risk aversion, and also 
each farmer might be different in their savings behavior. The existence of individual 
farmer-specific effects invariably leads to endogeneity bias. After addressing the issues of 
endogeneity and using a continuous dependent variable, this study employs a more 
5 reliable model for assessing creditworthiness, ultimately improving agricultural lenders’ 
ability to accurately evaluate potential borrowers and maximize loan profitability.  
 
2. Literature Review 
  As mentioned in the introduction, there are competing approaches for relating 
financial variables to creditworthiness. Therefore, a variety of explanatory variables and 
estimation techniques have been used for credit scoring models (Oltmans, 1994). While 
one set of studies focuses on individual loan quality information, other studies examine 
aggregate loan quality information to build credit scoring models.
2  
  Considering individual loan quality information, Miller and LaDue (1989) 
observe that financial measures of liquidity, profitability and operating efficiency are 
good indicators of borrower quality.
3 Mortensen et al. (1988) find that debt-to-asset, a 
solvency measure, and the operating ratios are the most effective treatment variables in 
explaining the loan performance of North Dakota farmers.
4 Zech and Pederson (2003) 
apply both linear and logistic regression to Southwestern Minnesota farm data to predict 
borrower repayment capacity (which is proxied by the coverage ratio).
5 They discover 
that the debt-to-asset ratio persistently exhibits a negative relation with farmer repayment 
capacity. Turvey and Brown (1990) conclude that measures of profitability, solvency, 
                                                 
2 The literature of credit scoring models is based mostly on individual rather than aggregate loan quality 
information. Aggregate loan quality information uses the macro and micro level, whereas individual loan 
quality information uses only the micro level indicators of loan quality. 
3 Liquidity shows how quickly one can generate cash. Profitability reflects wealth and the ability of a 
farmer to generate profit. Operating efficiency measures the farm’s efficiency of operating expense 
management.  
4 Debt-to-asset ratio is a measure for expressing farm business risk exposure. 
5 Coverage ratio relates asset returns to debt obligations for a period of time. 
6 financial efficiency, liquidity, and debt repayment capacity should be combined in credit 
scoring models for Canada’s Farm Credit Corporation.
6  
  Purdy et al. (1997) examine factors that influence the financial performance of a 
sample of Kansas farms. They discover that operator age, financial efficiency, farmland 
tenure position, and leverage negatively impact farm financial performance, while farm 
size has a positive impact on financial health.
7 Gloy et al. (2002) examine farm 
profitability in a panel of 106 New York dairy farms over a seven-year period. They use 
fixed-effects regression models to test hypotheses regarding the effects of managerial 
factors on farm performance. They find that individual farm effects, such as initial 
endowments, resource constraints, and production and financial management factors, 
impact farm profitability. Plumley and Hornbaker (1991) analyze the characteristics of 
successful Illinois farms, identified by net farm income per tillable acre. Their findings 
suggest that these successful farms have a balanced composition of assets, lower debt, 
and higher profitability. 
  For aggregate loan quality models, Oltmans (1994) shows that aggregate models 
do not provide early warning signals for changes in loan quality; however, they still 
indicate key factors that should be analyzed for understanding loan quality. He finds that 
collateral, liquidity, government program payments, off-farm income, and the debt-to-
asset ratio should be analyzed to understand loan quality.
8 Escalante et al. (2004) show 
that farm-specific factors, such as farm size, tenure, asset turnover, operator age, 
diversification index, soil productivity rating, and income risk, have little explanatory 
                                                 
6 Leverage is measured by the debt-to-equity ratio, and expresses the farm business’ risk exposure. 
Financial efficiency represents how effectively a business uses its assets to generate gross revenues. 
7 Farmland tenure position is the ratio of owned acres to total acres operated.  
8 Collateral is the property promised as a guarantee for loan repayment.  
7 power for the probability of credit risk transitions.
9 Instead, macroeconomic factors, such 
as money supply growth, farmland value growth, changes in agricultural long-term 
interest rates, and changes in stock price indexes, explain the probability of credit risk 
migration.  
 
3. Model Specification 
Recall that the expected profit of the farmer is given by: 
(1) E  (Π) = (1-PD) (1+r) (L) + (PD) ((1+r) L-LGD), 
where 
Π = Profit, 
r = Interest rate, 
L = Loan amount, 
PD = Probability of default and 
LGD = Loss given default.
10
Lenders’ objective is to maximize their return on a loan. From equation (1), this 
implies minimizing the expected losses due to borrower defaults. These expected losses 
depend on the probability of default (PD) and loss given default (LGD). The magnitude 
of the probability of default provides a signal about the creditworthiness of farmers (and 
by implication, the repayment capacity of farmers). One way to obtain an estimate of 
probability of default is to use farm financial data, which reflects the farmer’s 
                                                 
9 Note here that farm-specific factors do not mean farm-specific effects. Also, the asset turnover ratio 
measures the farm’s efficiency of asset utilization. 
10 Exposure at Default is the value of the farm debt at the time of default. Loss Given Default is the 
percentage of the Exposure at Default that is lost in the event of default. Essentially, Loss Given Default 
measures the severity of the default, and is set by the lender. For instance, the lender can ask for collateral 
or loan insurance so that the lender won’t be affected adversely in the case of default. Probability of 
Default, on the other hand, is set by the borrower, and shows the frequency of loss. Characteristics of the 
borrower determine this probability. 
8 creditworthiness. Therefore, variables used in this study for the farmer repayment 
capacity are constructed to reflect measures of the farmer’s creditworthiness.  
All variables analyzed in this study are recommended by the Farm Financial 
Standards Council (FFSC). Splett et al. (1994) argue that greater uniformity of the 
explanatory variables used can be achieved if all researchers employ only the FFSC 
recommended variable measures. 
FFSC recommends specific financial measures to evaluate the liquidity, solvency, 
profitability, repayment capacity and financial efficiency of farmers.
11 Previous studies 
have also used these FFSC standards to explain farm performance and to determine 
creditworthiness and credit scoring for farmers (Phillips and Katchova, 2004; Barry et al., 
2002; Mishra et al., 1999).  
Following Miller and LaDue (1989), the equation defining farmer repayment 
capacity is given as 







kiXk,it-1 + Dt + errorit , 
where 
Yit = creditworthiness, which is a continuous random variable proxied by repayment 
capacity and measured by the coverage ratio for individual i at time t, 
X1, it-1 = financial efficiency of the borrower measured by the asset turnover ratio for 
individual i at time t-1, 
                                                 
11 Profitability reflects wealth and the ability of the farmer to generate profit; liquidity shows how quickly 
one can generate cash; financial efficiency shows how efficiently one can convert financial inputs into 
financial output; and solvency and repayment capacity show whether one has enough capacity to pay debt. 
Solvency is a long-term dimension, whereas repayment capacity is a short-term dimension of debt 
payment. 
 
9 X2, it-1 = liquidity of the borrower measured by the working capital ratio for individual i at 
time t-1, 
X3, it-1 = solvency of the borrower measured by the debt-to-asset ratio for individual i at 
time t-1,  
X4, it-1 = profitability of the borrower measured by rate of return on equity (ROE) for 
individual i at time t-1 and 
X5, it-1 = other potential measurements that help to explain the repayment capacity of the 
borrower, such as the family expenditure and tenure ratios, operator age, soil 
productivity, and acreage for individual i at time t-1.
12  
These measurements capture the effects of the farmer’s experience, soil quality, 
economies of scale, etc. (Ellinger and Barry, 1987; Purdy et al., 1997; Gloy et al., 2002; 
Barry et al., 2001; Mishra et al., 1999).  
Dt is the time dummy where t = 2001, …, 2003. Note that 2004 is the base year for the 
study and that observations in the year 2000 are lost because one year lagged values are 
used as explanatory variables.  
  Note that a possible criticism of the model given by (2) is that it might in fact be 
an accounting identity. In other words, (2) is not meaningful if the right side is equivalent 
to the left side so that the error terms are identically zero. Despite this possible criticism, 
Zech and Pederson (2003) successfully use a version of (2) involving averages of the 
dependent and explanatory variables. Miller and LaDue (1989) also employ a version of 
(2), which uses loan repayment capacity as the dependent variable and proxies for the 
same set of explanatory variables.  
                                                 
12 Since age, soil productivity and acreage do not change significantly from year to year, this study uses the 
lagged values instead of the present values.  
10   In (2) (as in Miller and LaDue, 1989), creditworthiness is based on the previous 
period’s farm financial data, which explains why the model specification includes one 
period lagged value for explanatory variables.
13 Furthermore, using the lagged 
explanatory variables implies that the variables are pre-determined. Consequently, there 
is no endogeneity bias caused by correlation between the matrix of explanatory variables 
and the error matrix. Table 1 contains the definitions of the variables, as well as expected 
signs. A discussion of the dependent variable and the explanatory variables for the model 
follows.  
Dependent Variable: Farmer’s repayment capacity 
  Previous studies have examined default classification as an indicator of 
creditworthiness (Turvey and Brown, 1990; Escalante et al. 2004; and Phillips and 
Katchova, 2004). A problem with default classification is that it is based on subjective 
judgment on the part of the lender (Lufburrow et al., 1984). Recent studies have also used 
debt repayment capacity measured by the coverage ratio obtained from farm-level data as 
an alternative indicator of creditworthiness (Zech and Pederson, 2003; and Novak and 
LaDue, 1994). The advantage of this measure is that it uses a continuous, quantitative 
measure instead of a discrete, qualitative measure. However, debt repayment capacity 
cannot distinguish between variations in profitability and debt levels (Novak and LaDue, 
1997). A large (small or negative) coverage ratio implies a highly (less) profitable or less 
(highly) leveraged farmer. This paper uses the coverage ratio (dependent variable) as a 
measure of repayment capacity, and thus to measure creditworthiness.
14  
                                                 
13 Instead of the current period’s explanatory variable. 
14 Coverage ratio = Cash inflow / Cash outflow 
Cash inflow = Net farm income from operations + non-farm income + depreciation + interest on term-debt 
+ interest on capital - income taxes -family living withdrawals 
11 Explanatory Variables 
Based on Miller and LaDue (1989) and Zech and Pederson (2003), the evaluation 
in this study focuses on financial efficiency, liquidity, solvency, profitability and other 
farmer descriptive variables as explanatory measures to explain creditworthiness.  
1. Farmer’s financial efficiency:  
Following FFSC recommendations, the asset turnover ratio is used to measure the 
financial efficiency of the farmer. The asset turnover ratio measures the efficiency of 
asset utilization.
15 As the ratio increases, the more effectively assets are used to generate 
profits. Greater financial efficiency results in a higher repayment capacity. Therefore, a 
positive relationship is expected with the coverage ratio.  
2. Farmer’s Liquidity: 
The FFSC recommends using the working capital-to-gross farm return ratio as a 
liquidity indicator.
16 A higher ratio indicates the farmer has a greater ability to generate 
cash to meet short-term financial obligations. Thus, a positive relationship between the 
working capital ratio and the coverage ratio is expected.  
3. Farmer’s solvency: 
The debt-to-asset ratio is recommended by FFSC as a measure of farm solvency. 
It measures both the solvency of the farmer and the degree to which the farmer can meet 
long-term debt commitments.
17 Higher debt levels indicate greater financial obligations. 
Thus, the coverage ratio is expected to be lower (Zech and Pederson, 2003).  
                                                                                                                                                 
Cash outflow = Annual scheduled principal + interest payments on term debt and capital leases 
15 Asset Turnover ratio = Value of farm production / Total average farm assets (fair market value) 
16 Working Capital ratio = (Current assets-Current liabilities)/ Value of farm production 
Value of Farm Production = Crop returns + Livestock return above feed + Custom work + Other farm 
receipts 
17 Debt-to-Asset ratio = Total Debt / Fair market value of assets 
12 4. Farmer’s profitability: 
FFSC suggests that the rate of return on farm assets (ROA) and the rate of return 
on farm equity (ROE) are useful measures of a farmer’s profitability.
18 ROE determines 
the return on equity after paying interest expense, whereas ROA does not account for the 
leverage position of a firm. Boessen et al. (1990) show that higher leveraged farms 
exhibit greater variability in the return to equity compared to ROA. For these reasons, 
ROE is chosen over ROA as a measure of farm profitability. As ROE increases, cash 
inflow is expected to increase, thereby improving the coverage ratio.  
5. Other variables: 
Other variables, such as the family expenditure and tenure ratios, age, soil 
productivity and acreage, may also help to explain farmer repayment capacity. This paper 
investigates the effects of these variables in explaining farmers’ repayment ability. 
Examples of family expenditure include consumption, utilities, medical expenses, 
clothing, and household durable items.
19 Lower family expense levels provide the farmer 
with more cash to cover financial obligations. Therefore, a negative relation is expected 
with the coverage ratio. 
The age of the farm operator may provide some information about the likelihood 
of the lender being fully repaid. Older farmers face declining profitability and lower debt 
use since they are less productive. The reduction in productivity adversely affects 
                                                 
18 ROE = (Net farm operating income – Unpaid labor charge for operator and family ) / Average farm 
equity (fair market value) 
Net farm operating income = Gross farm revenue – Purchases of market livestock – Cost of purchased feed 
or grain – Total farm operating expenses – Total interest expense 
Equity = Market value of total assets – Total liabilities 
19 Family Expenditure ratio = Family living expenses / Total acres operated 
13 repayment capacity (Barry et al., 2001). Therefore, a negative relationship between age 
and the coverage ratio is hypothesized.  
The tenure ratio indicates the percentage of owned acres compared to total acres 
operated.
20 Farmers with a higher ratio tend to be less financially leveraged, exhibit less 
liquidity and earn a lower rate of return on assets (Ellinger and Barry, 1987; and Barry 
and Robison, 1986). Since most of the assets in a Midwest farm operation are tied to farm 
real estate, a larger portion of total returns occurs as unrealized capital gains on farmland. 
Since the farmer may not generate sufficient cash flow from the land itself to meet annual 
debt payments, the tenure ratio is expected to exhibit a negative relationship with the 
coverage ratio.  
Higher soil productivity is also a factor that may increase/maintain production, 
thereby enhancing repayment capacity. Soil productivity is likely to be positively 
correlated with the coverage ratio. 
As acreage increases, farmers take greater advantage of economies of scale or 
scope.
21 Intuitively, this likely results in a greater repayment capacity and higher 
coverage ratio.  
 
4. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The empirical analysis uses farm financial records collected from the Illinois 
FBFM Association to identify factors that explain borrower repayment capacity. The 
FBFM data comply with “FMV Balance Sheet Certification” and “Family Living/Sources 
                                                 
20 Tenure ratio = Owned acres / Total acres operated 
21 Acres = Acres operated 
14 and Uses Certification”.
22 Although it may be more beneficial to use real lender data 
instead of farm-level data, obtaining lender data is both difficult and costly. Previous 
studies have successfully employed farm-level data as a proxy for lender data (Katchova, 
and Barry, 2005; Escalante et al., 2004). Zech and Pederson (2003) and Novak and 
LaDue (1994) have also used farm business data to determine creditworthiness, proxied 
by the coverage ratio. Furthermore, an advantage of farm-level data is that it often 
includes farmers with low and high credit risks, in contrast to lender data that contains 
only low credit risk farmers (Escalante et al., 2004). 
The FBFM data is not completely random. Rather, it is obtained by means of a 
self-selection process, where farmers elect to provide their financial statements in return 
for technical advice from the FBFM staff. Despite this self-selection process, the data 
contain enough variability to distinguish between different farmers. The FBFM data 
include above-average and larger commercial farms in Illinois. Hence, they differ in their 
debt-to-asset ratios and they utilize debt with a wide range of financial performance 
(Katchova, and Barry, 2005). Also, the FBFM database reports accrual measures rather 
than cash measures, with fair market value asset valuation. Accrual measures are 
preferred to cash measures when classifying farmers by financial stress (Lins et al, 1987). 
The accrual measures ensure that all expenses that have been incurred but not paid for 
and all revenue that has been earned but not received are accounted for. For instance, an 
accrual cost is an accrued interest that is owed but not paid for and accrual revenue is 
unsold grain inventory. Accrual accounting recognizes the present value of all expenses 
and revenue and accounts for all impacts on current wealth of earnings during that period.  
                                                 
22 FMV and Family Living/Sources certified data are the most reliable data available. 
15 This study uses a balanced panel of 264 unique farmer identities from 2000 to 
2004.
23 This time period is chosen because it provides the greatest number of unique 
farmer identities given the available dataset. Table 2 displays mean values for variables 
under both “overall” and “year categories”. Table 2, column one contains the overall 
mean values for all variables from 2001 to 2004.
24 For instance, the coverage ratio has a 
mean value of 0.87. Since this ratio is less than one, it implies that on average cash inflow 
is less than cash outflow for Illinois farmers. Asset turnover, working capital and debt-to-
asset ratios all have mean values around 0.30. Moreover, ROE, which represents 
profitability, has a mean value of 0.12. The second, third and fourth columns of table 2 
report the mean values for each year from 2001 to 2004. The highest average annual 
coverage ratio is 1.54 in 2003, while the lowest is 0.48 in 2001. The standard deviation of 
the coverage ratio is moderately stable over the time period, but peaks in 2003 with a 
value of 14.81. Meanwhile, ROE and the family expenditure ratio reach their maximum 
values in 2003, with values of 0.35 and 3.78, respectively. ROE has a standard deviation 
of 3.73 and the family expenditure ratio has a standard deviation of 45.48 in 2003. The 
lowest average asset turnover ratio for Illinois farmers is recorded in 2003, with a value 
of 0.21 and a standard deviation of 0.40. Mean acreage of Illinois farms also increases 
each year attaining a high of 804 acres in 2004. Mean values for the working capital ratio, 
age, the tenure ratio and soil productivity are stable from 2001 to 2004.  
 
 
                                                 
23 Note that a unique farmer identity is not necessarily one observation. One farmer can have more than one 
observation.  
24 The year 2000 data point is deleted from the data since the explanatory variables are lagged one period. 
Consequently, the mean values for 2000 are also omitted. 
16 5. Panel Data Estimation Procedures   
  To identify the best linear unbiased estimator (BLUE) to use, recall that the 
general static panel-data model is given by 






’β + vit , 
where 
xit,g = explanatory variable g for individual i at time t for g = 1, 2, ---, k, 
vit = ci + uit for t = 1, 2, ---, T and i = 1, 2, ----, N, 
ci = unobserved effect (time invariant individual specific effect) and 
uit = idiosyncratic error term (time and individual variant disturbance term).  
  Pooled OLS (PLS) is consistent if      
(4) E  (x
’
it vit) = 0 for t = 1, 2, ----, T.  
 If Var (vit) is constant, then PLS is also efficient (Wooldridge, 2002). Equation (4) 
indicates that the data must satisfy strict exogeneity. To test for strict exogeneity, a test 
by Wooldridge (2002) is applied. The model for the test is as follows: 
(5) yit = xitβ + Mit+1α + vit, 
where xit refers to the explanatory variables at time t for individual i, which in this case 
are the lagged values for the financial measures used in our model, such as one year 
lagged value of ROE, one year lagged value of the working capital ratio, etc, and Mit+1 
refers to the value of the explanatory variable at time t+1. After running this regression 
with FE, we performed a joint F-test to test for the significance of α, where H0: α = 0. The 
F-test statistic is found to be 0.37, with a p-value of 0.9492. Since the null hypothesis of 
strict exogeneity cannot be rejected, the strict exogeneity assumption is satisfied. 
17 Next, a test for heteroskedasticity in a panel data setting is executed. The specific 
test applied is the White general test for heteroskedasticity, which has a null hypothesis 
of homoskedasticity. Since the White’s general test statistic is 84.51388, with a p-value 
of 0.4637, the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity cannot be rejected. 
  To check for AR (1) serial correlation in the idiosyncratic error terms of the linear 
panel-data model, another test due to Wooldridge’s test is used. The F-statistic is 
2,403.696, with a p-value of 0.0000.
25 Therefore, we conclude that there is serial 
correlation among idiosyncratic error terms. This means that any estimator that is 
selected as the BLUE estimator should necessarily account for autocorrelation. 
Even though the test result concludes that strict exogeneity holds, the possibility 
of endogeneity caused by individual specific effects and non-constant variance means 
that Pooled Least Squares (PLS) is often inconsistent or inefficient, so an alternative 
estimator, such as random effects (RE) or fixed effects (FE), may be preferred. Recall 
that RE is the GLS estimator, so it is the most efficient estimator under strict exogeneity. 
  We employ a test designed by Hausman (1978) and reproduced in Wooldridge 
(2002) to decide between the FE and the RE estimator.
26 To operationalize this test, 
individual means are added to the rest of the explanatory variables and estimation is done 
by fixed effects. The null hypothesis that all the individual means are jointly zero is tested 
against the alternative that the null is not true. Failure to reject the null hypothesis means 
that RE is the preferred estimator. By contrast, a rejection of the null implies that FE is 
                                                 
25 Xtserial command in Stata is applied.  
26 In order to decide between RE and FE estimation, the traditional Hausman test is performed, which is 
identical asymptotically to the Wooldridge test. The results from Hausman test indicate a chi-sq of 2.27, 
with p-value of 0.9973. Again, the null is not rejected: the difference of coefficients from FE and RE 
estimation is not systematic. Therefore, the RE estimation is consistent and efficient.  We also note that the 
traditional Hausman test has been severely criticized in the STATA community of users so the Wooldridge 
test result is more credible. 
18 the preferred estimator. The test results show a chi-sq of 2.84, with a p-value of 0.9702, 
so the null hypothesis is not rejected and RE is consistent and efficient. However, the 
selection of RE over FE does not necessarily imply that there are no individual effects, 
but it does indicate that there is no correlation between the unobserved time invariant 
individual effects and the explanatory variables. This means that if individual specific 
effects are present, they are not causing endogeneity bias. Based on the outcome of the 
Wooldridge test, we select the RE estimator as the preferred estimator. To account for 
serial correlation, we use the robust command in Stata to compute the robust version of 
the RE estimator.  
 
6. Results  
  Table 3 displays the main results of the study. These results are obtained by using 
a balanced panel data from 2000 to 2004, with 264 unique farmer identities. No outlier 
adjustment is performed.
27
  As mentioned in the econometric section of this paper, the panel data analysis is 
performed for the balanced panel data from 2000 to 2004 to achieve two main objectives: 
(1) identify which explanatory variables are significantly correlated with the dependent 
variable and (2) investigate whether individual, farmer-specific effects are causing 
endogeneity bias in the coverage ratio regression. One year lagged debt-to-asset ratio and 
one year lagged soil productivity are all found to be significant at the 5 % significance 
level. Accounting for endogeneity bias in this model is pragmatic because there are likely 
                                                 
27 Even if outliers that are three standard deviations from the mean are deleted, the results stay the same. 
Furthermore, the correlation matrix indicates that the correlation among explanatory variables is low. Based 
on Kennedy (2003), a correlation coefficient in absolute value of 0.8 or 0.9 is assumed to have high 
collinearity. 
19 farmer-specific effects that are time invariant but vary from farmer to farmer because no 
two farmers are exactly identical in their savings behavior. These farmer-specific effects 
may cause endogeneity bias. Results from the analysis indicate that there is no correlation 
between the unobserved time invariant farmer effects and the explanatory variables. 
Since the null hypothesis of strict exogeneity is tested and accepted, the RE estimator is 
chosen as the best candidate for the BLUE estimator. The Wooldridge test of endogeneity 
confirms that RE (the GLS estimator) is preferred to FE (the consistent estimator) and RE 
is the BLUE estimator for this study.  
This study uses farmer repayment capacity as a proxy for farmer creditworthiness. 
Concluding that the lagged debt-to-asset ratio and lagged soil productivity are significant 
does not completely agree with the conclusions of Escalante et al. (2004). Escalante et al. 
(2004) find that farm-specific factors, such as soil productivity, have little explanatory 
power associated with the probability of credit transitions.
28 On the other hand, this study 
suggests that there is a positive relationship between one year lagged soil productivity 
and the farmer’s coverage ratio (and by implication the farmer’s repayment capacity), 
conforming to expectations. However, the coefficient for lagged soil productivity is small 
(0.02), though significant, creating concern regarding the significance of this variable in 
determining farmer repayment capacity. The elasticity estimate for soil productivity 
calculated at the means of the dependent and explanatory variables is 1.89, so the 
response is elastic in spite of the small magnitude of the coefficient. One way of 
explaining the small magnitude for lagged soil productivity may be that it validates the 
low significance Escalante et al (2004) find.  
                                                 
28 Note here that farm-specific factors do not mean farm-specific effects. 
 
20 The one year lagged debt-to-asset ratio, which measures the solvency of a farm 
business, affects the coverage ratio negatively at the 5% significance level, confirming to 
expectations and consistent with the results of most previous studies, such as Zech and 
Pederson (2003) and Mortensen et al. (1988). As the lagged debt-to-asset ratio increases, 
the financial obligation of the farmer increases. This implies that there is a higher 
probability that the farmer will not be able to repay debt. Therefore, the coverage ratio is 
expected to be negatively correlated with the debt-to-asset ratio. The regression results 
indicate that as the lagged debt-to-asset ratio increases by one unit, the coverage ratio 
decreases by 4.04 units. The elasticity of the lagged debt to asset ratio with respect to the 
coverage ratio is -1.67, so in percentage terms the lagged debt to asset ratio is responsive 
(though negatively) to the coverage ratio. 
The year 2001 dummy is significant at 5%. Considering that our base year is 
2004, we conclude that farmer repayment capacity changes over time. In other words, a 
significant event occurred in year 2001 when compared to 2004, but the same can not be 
said for the other year dummies. Recall that the September 11 attack on the World Trade 
Center escalated the slow down of the economy, so this might explain the significance of 
the year 2001 dummy.  
When joint significance is tested under the null hypothesis that coefficients of all 
explanatory variables are zero, a chi-sq test statistic of 41.22, with a p-value of 0.0000, is 
obtained and the null hypothesis is rejected. The rejection of the null hypothesis implies 
the model is valid. Also, a look at the R-sq statistics for the random effects model shows 
that it is 0.0056, 0.0670, and 0.0241 for within, between and overall, respectively. 
21 Although these numbers are relatively small, they are consistent with estimates in the 
previous literature that include ROE measures in their analyses.  
  
7. Summary 
  This paper aims to identify those factors that are pertinent in explaining farmer 
repayment capacity by using the FBFM data for Illinois farms. A related objective is to 
help agricultural lenders more accurately evaluate credit risk, better screen borrowers, 
arrange their loan loss reserves, price their loans more accurately, and decrease the 
probability of bankruptcy due to defaulted loans. A reduction in the costs associated with 
defaulted loans will ultimately translate into lower costs borne by the government and 
taxpayers.  
  Although various studies in the literature have used different financial measures 
to explain creditworthiness, no research has considered the possibility of endogeneity 
bias due to farmer-specific effects in a panel data setting. After controlling for individual 
specific effects, the RE estimator is chosen as the BLUE estimator. By employing panel 
data techniques to a sample of Illinois farmers, this study finds that one year lagged 
values of soil productivity and the debt-to-asset ratio, which is a solvency measure, are 
the most significant factors in explaining farmers’ coverage ratios. These results suggest 
that these two explanatory factors should be included in any set of variables used in credit 
scoring models. However, the low impact of soil productivity, in terms of its coefficient, 
in explaining the coverage ratio (a measure of farmer repayment capacity) deserves 
attention.  
22 The results from this study are significant in that previous studies in the financial 
literature have come up with different indicators of creditworthiness depending on the 
explanatory variables used. This paper considers how the possible existence of individual 
farmer-specific effects impacts the factors for the determination of farmer repayment 
capacity. 
  Future study might consider using aggregate as well as individual loan quality 
information. The possibility of nonlinear relationships between farmer repayment 
capacity and explanatory variables might also be a topic worthy of future research. 
Additional effort could also be directed toward acquiring a larger dataset, since the 
central limit theorem maintains that the consistency of parameter estimates improves as 
the dataset expands. Another opportunity for further research could be to include the 
lagged dependent variable as one of the explanatory variables and repeat the analysis 
performed. This will invariably involve the use of dynamic panel estimators and will 
provide a medium to investigate the role, if any, for dynamics. 
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Table 1: Variable Definitions and Expected Signs    
Dependent Variable: Coverage ratio
c
    
Explanatory Variables  Definitions  Expected Signs   
Financial Efficiency:        
Asset turnover ratio  Value of farm production / Total average farm assets  +   
Liquidity:         
Working capital ratio
a Working capital / Value of farm production  +   
Solvency:         
Debt to asset ratio  Total debt / Total assets (fair market value)  -   
Profitability:         
ROE
b Net farm operating income - unpaid labor charge for operator and 
family / Average farm equity (fair market value)  +   
Other:         
Family expenditure ratio  Family living expenses / Total acres operated  -   
Age  Age of the operator  -   
Tenure ratio  Owned acres / Total acres operated  -   
Soil productivity  Soil productivity rating  +   
Acres  Acres operated   +   
aValue of farm production = Crop returns + livestock return above feed + custom work + other farm receipts     
Working Capital = Current assets - Current liabilities       
bNet farm operating income = Gross farm revenue – Purchases of market livestock – Cost of purchased feed/grain – Total farm 
operating expenses – Total interest expense     
cCoverage ratio=Cash inflow/ Cash outflow    
Cash inflow= Net farm income from operations + non-farm income + depreciation + interest on term-debt + interest on capital - income taxes -family living withdrawals 








Table 2: Mean Values for Variables   
Variables  Overall Year 2001  Year 2002  Year 2003  Year 2004 
Coverage ratio  0.87          0.48 0.58 1.54 0.89
   (7.66)          (1.60) (2.02) (14.81) (2.97)
Asset turnover ratio  0.32          0.35 0.35 0.21 0.39
   (0.28)          (0.20) (0.20) (0.40) (0.23)
Working capital ratio  0.30          0.27 0.26 0.31 0.36
   (0.53)          (0.55) (0.51) (0.52) (0.51)
Debt to asset ratio  0.36          0.37 0.37 0.36 0.34
   (0.19)          (0.19) (0.19) (0.18) (0.18)
ROE  0.12          0.06 0.02 0.35 0.06
   (2.02)          (0.79) (0.60) (3.73) (1.19)
Family expenditure ratio  0.94          -0.64 0.84 3.78 -0.23
   (28.20)          (20.89) (17.08) (45.48) (19.53)
Age  51         49 50 51 52
   (9)          (9) (9) (9) (9)
Tenure ratio  0.25          0.23 0.24 0.26 0.26
   (0.25)          (0.23) (0.24) (0.27) (0.27)
Soil productivity  82         83 82 82 83
   (10)          (10) (10) (10) (10)
Acres  772          736 762 784 804
   (478)          (435) (466) (490) (518)
Number of observations  1,056       264 264 264 264 
The numbers in parenthesis are standard deviations.        
 
  
Table 3: Random Effects Results       
Lagged asset turnover ratio  -0.26     
   (0.37)      
Lagged working capital ratio  0.89     
   (0.75)      
Lagged ROE  0.01     
   (0.01)      
Lagged family expenditure ratio  0.00     
   (0)      
Lagged debt to asset ratio  -4.04     
   (1.62)**     
Lagged age  -0.04     
   (0.03)      
Lagged tenure ratio  -1.18     
   (1.5)      
Lagged soil productivity  0.02     
   (0.01)**     
Lagged acres  0.00     
   (0)      
Year 2000  NA     
   NA     
Year 2001  -0.50     
   (0.23)**     
Year 2002  -0.28     
   (0.2)      
Year 2003  0.74     
   (0.92)      
Constant term  2.66     
   (2.05)      
Wald Chi2(13)  133.05     
Prob>Chi2 0.0000     
R-sq within  0.0056     
R-sq between  0.0670     
R-sq overall  0.0241     
Number of observations  1,056     
Number of groups  264     
*The numbers in parentheses are standard errors, and ***, **, * represent significance at 1, 5, and 10% respectively. 
*Lagged values are one year lagged values.      
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